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THE IMPLICATIONS OF WYMAN V. JAMES:
THE BURGER COURT, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
AND THE PRIVACY OF THE HOME
INTRODUCTION

T

HE legal community, and to a surprising extent the American public, await each decision of the Burger Court with
fear or hopeful expectancy, depending upon individual ideological stance. Will the recent personnel changes spell the end
of the personal liberties which the Warren Court so courageously forged from the unyielding metal of precedent? Will
the right of the state to protect society be freed from the
albatross of "defendant's rights" which the Warren Court
created? The emotional tone of these questions is intentional,
illustrating the primary obstacle to rational analysis of the
decisions being handed down. Each is examined for consonance
with personal philosophy and condemned or applauded on that
basis alone. It is the thesis of this note, and its format, that
no such personal reaction can make any claim to validity
unless it is supported by a sound analysis of the legal background against which a given case appears.
The case to be discussed is Wyman v. James.' It concerned
the widespread practice of caseworker visits to the homes of
welfare recipients. The general area of law involved is the
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure as applied to administrative action. Pursuant to
the thesis stated above, the history of the area is analyzed at
some length before the principal case is even considered. It
is hoped that Wyman will stand in clear relief against this
background.
One word of caution, since the Burger Court is indeed new
and is applying its constitutional concepts to a body of precedent which may well reflect a very different view, any decision should be looked upon only as an intermediate statement.
The Supreme Court has traditionally moved by evolution rather
than sudden departure. These early cases are of value more
for what they presage than for what they establish.
I.

CASE ANALYSIS

The fourth amendment itself must be the starting point of
any discussion of search and seizure law:
1 400 U.S. 309

(1971).
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

Early cases faced with applying this prohibition relied
heavily on its history to give it meaning. The amendment was
largely a reaction to the hated general warrants issued prior
to the Revolution which authorized unrestricted searches for
evidence of crime." Although no such limitation appears in
the language, it was assumed that the protection applied only
to searches for such evidence, and not to administrative inspections. Even cases extending coverage to proceedings not
strictly criminal were careful to state that the action in preparation for which the search was made must be criminal in
essence or effect. Boyd v. United States3 is the hallmark here.
The fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure was held applicable to a forfeiture proceeding.
The inclusion was accomplished not by extending the boundaries of the amendment, but rather by bringing within the
established area of its protection a form of action spiritually
akin to those criminal actions to which it had traditionally been
applied. Although seemingly expansive, the case served to
reaffirm the criminal/civil distinction in search and seizure
4
cases.
The Court also found a close connection between the
fourth and fifth amendments.
[T]he "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned by the
Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose
of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which
in criminal cases is condemned by the Fifth Amendment; and
compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws
light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search5
and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

This guideline of reasonableness, coupled with the assumption that the fourth amendment applied only to cases criminal
in essence, left administrative searches virLually ungoverned.
If the purpose or possible result of the search is a legitimate
criterion for judging its conformity with constitutional stand"See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1886).
3 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
The Boyd case is perhaps unjustifiably maligned in later references back
to its holding. The opinion itself rings with protective sentiment, and a
passage therefrom is quoted at the conclusion of this comment as the
most appropriate attitude for modern courts. However, the case does
preserve a boundary of fourth amendment coverage, and it is to that
concept that later references are made.
116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
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ards, only the most severe administrative penalty will suffice
to trigger the fourth amendment. Indeed, it must amount to
a criminal punishment.
For many years after Boyd the Court did not consider the
criminal/civil border of the fourth amendment. There was,
however, a steady flow of criminal cases involving search and
seizure doctrine. The opinions evidenced increasing concern
with the right of citizens to privacy in their homes. Such a
right was seen as "basic to a free society."" Absent extreme
circumstances, it could not lawfully be abridged without interposing the independent judgment of a magistrate between the
zeal of the law enforcement officer and the privacy of the
individual. 7
6Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
T

The effort here is to portray the "feel" of the opinions rather than the
specific points of law for which they stand. In aid of that effort, rather
lengthy portions of several cases representative of the period are reproduced here.
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925):
The protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to all
equally, - to those justly suspected or accused, as well as to
the innocent. The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws. Id.
at 32.
Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a
search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are
held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing
probable cause. Id. at 33.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948):
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a
search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not
to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for
illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might
weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the
law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust
to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime
and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history
shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.
And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the
desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the
home. We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement
and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional
mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative. Id. at 455-56.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949):
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police - which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment
-is
basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in "the
concept of ordered liberty" and as such enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause. The knock at the
door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search,
without authority of law but solely on the authority of the
police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be
condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights
enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples. Id. at 27-28.
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The language of these cases was pitched in broad terms
which focused on the intrusiveness rather than the purpose
of the search. True, all the searches considered were designed
to uncover evidence of crime. But the wording of the opinions,
and the spirit behind them, expressed a solicitude for personal
privacy which made the purpose or result of the intrusion seem
secondary. It was the intrusion itself which was offensive
to the fourth amendment.
This trend had developed sufficiently by 1949 to lead the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to assume that
the protection of the fourth amendment was not conditioned
on the purpose of the search. In District of Columbia v.
Little," Judge Prettyman reversed the defendant's criminal conviction for failure to allow a health inspector access to his
home. He expressly rejected the criminal/civil distinction in
phrases that echoed the protective attitude of the criminal cases
mentioned above.
When the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches, it,
of course, by implication, permits reasonable searches. But
reasonableness without a warrant is adjudged solely by the
extremity of the circumstances of the moment and not by any
general characteristic of the officer or his mission. If an
officer is pursuing a felon who runs into a house and hides,
the officer may follow and arrest him. But this is because
under the exigencies of circumstance the law of pursuit supersedes the rule as to search. There is no doctrine that search
for garbage is reasonable while search for arms, stolen goods
or gambling equipment is not. Moreover, except for the most
urgent of necessities, the question of reasonableness is for a
magistrate and not for the enforcement officer.9
The basic premise of the prohibition against searches
was not protection against self-incrimination; it was the commonlaw right of a man to privacy in his home, a right which is one
of the indispensable ultimate essentials of our concept of civilization. .

.

. It was not related to crime or to suspicion of crime.

... To say that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against search of his home without a warrant, but that a
man not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic
absurdity.10
We emphasize that no matter who the officer is or what
his mission, a government official cannot invade a private
home, unless (1) a magistrate has authorized him to do so or
(2) an immediate major crisis in the performance of duty
affords neither time nor opportunity to apply to a magistrate.
This right of privacy is not conditioned upon the objective,
s 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
11Id. at 16.

1l Id. at 16-17.
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the prerogative or the stature of the intruding officer. His
uniform, badge, rank, and the bureau from which he operates
are immaterial. It is immaterial whether he is motivated by
the highest public purpose or by the lowest personal spite. 1

This language is clearly consistent with the principle of
protection of personal privacy from official intrusion established in the criminal cases upon which Judge Prettyman
relied. Just as clearly, it represents the application of that
principle to a context foreign to its birth. The apparent conclusion in Little was that the protection was so fundamental
to our society as to transcend the purpose of the official intrusion. It was a general tenet of the citizen's relationship to
his government, rather than a mere limit on officers of criminal
law enforcement.
On appeal, the Supreme Court did not consider the constitutional issue.' 2 They affirmed the decision on the ground that
Little's conduct was not covered by the statute under which
he was charged. It was not until 1959 in Frank v. Maryland"
that the Court squarely confronted the problem of administrative searches.
A Baltimore health inspector, acting pursuant to statutory
authority and with probable cause to suspect violation of the
health code, requested and was denied permission to inspect
defendant's house for evidence of rodent infestation. Refusal
to allow inspection was a misdemeanor under Maryland law.
The Supreme Court declined to follow the direction taken in
Little. Rather than regarding all official intrusions as unreassonable unless supported in the particular instance by a warrant or extenuating facts, they undertook a balancing of the
interests involved to determine the reasonableness in general
14
of this type of intrusion.
In arriving at a balance, the Court considered four factors.
First, the history of the fourth amendment indicates that it
was primarily concerned with searches for evidence of crime.
Boyd was cited for the proposition that the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment is the usual measure of unreasonableness under the fourth. Although this historical alliance
was not an unyielding limit on the fourth amendment, it did
indicate that the rights invaded here were, at best, on the
11 Id. at 17.
12 District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
3 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
14 Id. "Application of the broad restraints of due process compels inquiry
into the nature of the demand being made upon individual freedom in
a particular context and the justification of social need on which the
demand rests." Id. at 363.
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"periphery" of the area protected. Second, the inspections
contemplated by the statute in question were hedged about
with safeguards. The inspector must have valid grounds to
suspect that a nuisance exists; inspection must be made in
the day time; the inspector cannot force entry if permission
to inspect is denied. These requirements tended to minimize
the intrusion involved. Third, the power to inspect in connection with enforcement of health codes had a long history
in Maryland. Two hundred years of acceptance by a free
people would make any practice seem reasonable. Fourth, the
importance of efficient health code enforcement has grown
apace with the mushrooming cities and their inevitable slums.
To deprive local goverment of the power to inspect would
cripple enforcement efforts.
These considerations tipped the balance in favor of the
constitutionality of warrantless health inspections. The outcome was predetermined by the approach. The factors considered are, for the most part, those which make the warrant
procedure a permissible exception, embodied in the fourth
amendment, to the general prohibition against governmental
intrusion, i.e., e.g., society has a paramount interest in preventing and punishing crime and therefore searches necessary to
the vindication of that interest are reasonable. But the Constitution not only allows this exception, it piovides certain controls on its exercise. Those who would use it must demonstrate, by showing probable cause in support of a warrant,
that this particular search will truly serve the interest which
is the basis of the exception.
Case law has created several exceptions to the exception. 15
For example, a warrantless search is reasonable if made in7
cident to a valid arrest," ; in hot pursuit of a criminal,' under
15 These exceptions prove troublesome to consistent analysis throughout the
paper. They are undeniably searches which can be made without a warrant. No claim is made that they are absolutely reconcilable with the
fourth amendment. However, it is felt that these exceptions to the warrant requirement are of a different magnitude than the broad power
given in Frank to search without considering the need for a warrant.
Each recognizes the right of privacy of the person searched but allows
a warrantless intrusion either because the exigencies of the situation
demand it or because in that situation the right of privacy no longer
exists, No such claim can be made for the Frank holding.
14 E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). This exception is perhaps
the most troublesome of all. Without undertaking an elaborate analysis,
it would seem that cne's right to privacy is something of a nullity once
he has been validly arrested. In Chimel the Court greatly narrowed the
permissible scope of a search ma-ie incident to arrest. Officers can search
the area within the reach of the person arrested to protect themselves
and to prevent destruction of evidence. No further search is allowed.
Thus, privacy is invaded only to the extent to which it is lost by virtue
of the arrest.
17 E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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valid consent,1 8 to prevent loss of evidence," to protect the
life of the officer,'2"' etc. It might appear that Frank has
merely added another to this list - administrative searches.
But notice that the holding in Frank is on another level altogether. The exceptions to the warrant requirement listed above
are just that - searches which, but for the special circumstances in that particular case, would have required a warrant.
Frank created not another exception to the warrant requirement, but an exception coequal with the warrant requirement.
To wit: An official invasion of personal privacy is unreasonable unless (1) it is supported by a warrant or justified by
one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement or, (2) it is
an administrative search. Stated differently, a criminal search,
if reasonable in particular, is reasonable in general, and therefore reasonable as a whole. An administrative search is reasonable.
The Court apparently felt justified in this holding by
the safeguards which the statute imposed upon the search.
They closely resemble those which are supplied by a warrant.
A warrant will issue only on a showing of probable cause;
the inspector must have reasonable grounds to suspect that
a nuisance exists. But here is the crucial difference, in a
search requiring a warrant, an impartial magistrate must
review the facts adduced in support of the proposed search to
guard against the possibility that improper considerations will
play a part in the decision; in an administrative search, the
inspector on the street decides. The fo.rmer is the only effective way to prevent misuse of power. Manifestly, the fourth
amendment was to guard against, rather than to punish for,
violations of personal privacy. Even accepting the Court's
definition of reasonable, Frank withholds from potential victims of unreasonable administrative searches their only real
protection.
Justice Douglas, writing for a group of four dissenters,
proposed a more flexible solution. He favored requiring a
warrant, but adjusting the standard of probable cause to fit
the situation. The facto.rs justifying an administrative investigation are clearly distinguishable from those which sup-

is E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United States,
225 U.S.313 (1921).
19 E.g., Schmerber v.California, 384 U.S.757 (1966).
20 E.g., Terry v.Ohio,392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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port a criminal search. Probable cause for the issuance of an
administrative warrant should therefore be tailored to reflect
these differences.
Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of
certain facilities without a further showing of cause to believe
that substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being
maintained. The passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify
the issuance of a warrant. The test of "probable cause"
required by the Fourth Amendment 2can take into account the
nature of the search that is sought. 1
The Douglas approach provides a mutual accommodation
which attempts to serve both the interest of the people and
that of the state. A warrant is required, thus protecting personal privacy, but the special level of probable cause allows a
warrant to be simply obtained given administrative regularity.
Both majority and dissenting opinions balance interests, but
the effort of the latter is to adjust so as to bring the balance
to equilibrium. The majority weighs, judges one more weighty,
and gives it vent over the other.
The philosophy of the Frank majority was followed
the next year in Eaton v. Price.22 A state court decision-' was affirmed by an equally divided Court, Mr. Justice
Stewart taking no part in the case. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote
an extraordinary opinion "'4 for the same group which had dissented in Frank. The opinion pointed out that the facts in
Eaton were living proof of the dangers inherent in the Frank
doctrine. A housing inspector, without a warrant or even
proper credentials, had demanded access to Earl Taylor's
house. 2 He failed to offer any justification for the inspection
at the time and in court relying instead on his naked statutory
authority to enter any dwelling he chose. The probable cause
in Frank was glaringly absent.2 6 For all that appeared in the
reccrd, the inspector could have been acting on purely personal
considerations.
!1 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959).
22 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
2: Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958).
:4 In cases involving an evenly divided Court, no opinion or voting breakdown is usually given.
25 The opinion quoted at length the conversations between Mr. Taylor and
the inspector. Mr. Taylor's folksy defense of his right to preserve his
home inviolate was enough to bring visions of the Fathers to judicial
heads,
6 Both facts sufficient to constitute probable cause and statutory language
that would require it were missing in this case, so also were the other
safeguards found in Frank.
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Justice Brennan looked to Little as the proper treatment
of administrative investigations and renewed the insistence
on a warrant supported by an adjusted standard of probable
cause. With this factual demonstration that the protections
supposed to exist in Frank were wholly illusory, further adherence to that case could not be comprehended.
After Frank and Eaton the law of administrative searches
lay dormant for almost a decade."7 However, the period was
far from unimportant. "' Justices Whittaker and Frankfurter,
the authors of the concurring and majority opinions in Frank,
left the Court and were replaced by Justices White and
Fortas."1 This change in personnel, and in personality, was
telling when next the Court considered the constitutionality
of warrantless inspections. In 1967 the minority view in Frank

27 While it is true that the Supreme Court took no action in this area, the

California Supreme Court handed down a case in 1967 which deserves
consideration, if only in a footnote. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66
Cal. App. 2d 260, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 425 P.2d 223 (1967), involved the infamous midnight welfare raid. Plaintiff, an employee of the welfare
agency, was dismissed for insubordination after he refused to participate
in a planned raid known as "Operation Weekend." The object was to
swoop down on the homes of welfare recipients during sleeping hours to
see if unauthorized males were occupying fatherly positions in supposedly
fatherless families. The plaintiff's contention was that these raids were
illegal, and that he could not be dismissed for refusing to take part. The
California court agreed. They assumed that Frank had created an exception to the warrant requirement based on "a distinction between searches
directed to the procurement of evidence of crime and searches aimed
toward the advancement of the general welfare by means other than
criminal prosecutions (footnote omitted)." Id. at 264, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 627,
425 P.2d at 227. But Frank was distinguished on four grounds which are
especially interesting when compared to the holding in Eaton and that
in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), discussed later in the text (see
text p. 103 infra). First, the court found that these midnight raids were
more nearly criminal searches than that in Frank since the latter could
only result in punishment if the nuisance discovered by the search was
not abated after issuance of a court order. Welfare raids could uncover
evidence of fraud which without more forms the basis of a criminal
prosecution. Second, the loss of benefits which was the consequence of
discovered fraud is a forfeiture, criminal in nature, and therefore not
within the Frank exception. Third, the statutory requirement of valid
grounds to suspect a violation was not present here - houses were raided
indiscriminately. Fourth, the procedural safeguards were also absent.
The third and fourth of these considerations had been equally true
in Eaton. The first and second are discussed, with exactly the opposite
conclusion, in Wyman. The California court, obviously no fan of the
Frank doctrine, used all four in combination to escape its effect. In all
probability, the severity of this case would have driven even the Frank
majority past the limit of their doctrine.
c In addition to the personnel changes described in the text, this period
saw the decision of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). That
now famous case elevated the right of privacy to constitutional status not
dependent on any invasion of purely fourth amendment rights. The
continuing advancement of privacy in the judicial scale of values could
not help but carry over into search and seizure law.
2!1 To be true to chronology. Justice Frankfurter was replaced by Justice
Goldberg in 1962 and Justice Goldberg, in turn, by Justice Fortas in 1965.
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carried the day in the companion cases of Camara v. Municipal
Court30 and See v. Seattle.3 1
In Camara, appellant had repeatedly refused to permit a
housing inspector, acting pursuant to statutory authority but
without a warrant, to enter his home. He was charged with
violating the inspection statute, and unsuccessfully sought a
writ of prohibition in the state courts. The District Court of
Appeals of California ,32 in conformity with Frank, "held that
[the municipal statute authorizing inspection] does not violate
fourth amendment rights because it 'is part of a regulatory
scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in
nature, inasmuch as this section creates a right of inspection
which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions.' '":3 The Supreme Court reversed.
Mr. Justice White's opinion reflects a basic departure from
the Frank approach.
Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the
abstract prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" into workable guidelines for the decision of particular
cases is a difficult task which has for many years divided the
members of this Court. Nevertheless, one governing principle,
justified by history and by current experience, has consistently
been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of
cases, a search of private property without proper consent is
"unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search
34
warrant.
The outcome is predictable. Prime importance is to be placed
on the warrant requirement rather than on some far-reaching
judicial notion of the reasonableness of a whole class of
searches.
The Court proceeded to reexamine the factors which had
persuaded the Frank majority. The first is the most important.
Frank had held that because of the close historical connection
between the fou.rth and fifth amendments, the rights affected
by administrative inspections were only "peripheral." Since
the object was not to uncover evidence of crime, the interest
of "self-protection" embodied in the two amendments was not
involved, but only the "less intense" right to be secure from
intrusion into personal privacy. Justice White agreed that
inspections represent a less hostile intrusion; nevertheless, he
30 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
31 Id. at 541.
32

33
34

Camara v. Municipal Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 128, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965).
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
Id. at 528-29.
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could not subscribe to the view that only "peripheral" rights
were affected. Every citizen has a real interest in limiting
the occasions upon which official intrusion is permissible.
"It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." 5
Compare the view of the fourth amendment taken here
to those found in past cases. We have seen an evolution in
judicial attitude. Throughout, the fourth has been acknowledged to have a dual purpose: (1) to protect fifth amendment
rights against self-incrimination from being compromised
through violation of fourth amendment rights, and (2) to protect the rights of the individual to be free of unwarranted
official invasion of privacy. But the relative weight given each
of these factors has varied. In Boyd, the first was considered
the limit of the second. In Frank, the first, though not an
absolute limit, was clearly ascendant. The second was only
peripheral. Camara, echoing Little, gave independent status
to the personal privacy aspect. For the first time, an invasion of either of the interests protected by the fourth amendment was held sufficient to condemn a warrantless search.
The Court then considered, in light of this view, the other
justifications offered in support of the inspection statute. First,
the inspections are "designed to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant." They are hedged with procedural safeguards (similar to those in Frank) and the inspector's decision to enter must be reasonable even though he need
not obtain a warrant. Second, the warrant procedure could
not function effectively here since the decision to inspect an
area is based on legislative consideration of broad factors not
properly reviewable by a magistrate. The most stringent requirement of an administrative warrant would be obtaining
the judge's rubber stamp.
These are the arguments of the Frank majority. They are
rejected.
In our opinion these arguments unduly discount the purpose behind the warrant requirement contemplated by the
Fourth Amendment. Under the present system, when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing
whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires
inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful
limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper
authorization. These are questions which may be reviewed by
35 Id. at 530.
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a neutral magistrate without any reassessment of the basic
agency decision to canvass an area. . . . The practical effect
of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion
to invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search. . . . We simply cannot say that the
protections provided by the warrent procedure are not needed
in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute
for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards
36
may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.

Finally, it was argued that the public interest in effective
enforcement of health and safety laws demands that such
inspections be permitted. The Court agreed. But, "[i]n assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public interest justifies
the type of search in question, but whether the authority to
search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search.":"7

The Court adopted the warrant requirement urged by the
Frank dissent. Probable cause could be supplied by a showing
of adminstrative regularity. The Frank exception was gone
and along with it

went its asymmetrical

view

of the fourth

in Boyd at least there had been theoretical
amendment purity. The fourth amendment applied only to searches made
in

aid

of

proceedings

criminal

in

essence.

Frank extended

half of the fourth amendment to administrative

investigations.

They were required to be reasonable in general, which the
Court said they were, but no advance showing had to be made
that

they

were

reasonable

in

particular.

This

position

was

totally inconsistent with the constitutional verbiage. Under the
Camara view, the fourth amendment either applies or it
not.

It

tation. : !'

does

will admit to internal adjustment, but not to fragmenCantara cured the Frank imbalance by giving effect

31; Id. at 532-33.
Id. at 533.
8, Again it must be stressed that such doctrinaire statements are hazarded
only because we deal with the most basic element of the fourth amendment - the reasonableness of a search at its inception. Many of the incidents of the fourth amendment can be judicially varied with no loss of
purity. But the basic command is that unreasonable searches are not
permitted, and reasonableness in a particular instance is a function of
the wairant procedure. including its exceptions. There is no way consistent with this basic command to separate and forgive either of these
requirements. The only logical exceptions, and these, it must be admitted,
have no basis in fourth amendment language, are those which involve
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to both halves of the fourth amendment in criminal and admin39
istrative searches.
One wishes that the story ended here. It does not. We
have yet to treat the case which is the occasion of this note,
Wyman v. James.40 New York law requires periodic caseworker
a waiver of the rights which would otherwise be violated or special
circumstances in which pause to obtain a warrant would frustrate the
purpose of the search. All of these exceptions excuse the need to obtain
a warrant in that particular case. They are alternative means of judging
reasonableness in particular. They do not excuse the need that such a
judgment be made in the future. No such claim can be made for the
Frank holding.
The author is not unaware of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
which would seem to belie the all or nothing concept of the fourth
amendment attributed to the Warren Court. It was there recognized that
the problems encountered by policemen on the street are not always so
kind as to mold themselves into some convenient constitutional form.
Various street encounters call for varied police response. A "stop and
frisk" is made for the purpose of preventing crime and is clearly not
as intrusive as a full scale arrest and station house search. The two
should not be subject to the same rules. Consequently the Court adjusted
the probable cause standard downward to reflect the purpose and
necessity of the stop and frisk. In regard to the warrant requirement,
the Court pointed out that it is completely impractical in this type of
situation where the officer is dealing with people he believes to be on
the verge of committing a crime. It is very important to keep the exception to the warrant requirement separate from the adjusted probable
cause. The former is squarely in line with the other exceptions we have
seen. It depends upon an emergency situation which does not allow both
the warrant and the search. The latter, to borrow Justice Douglas' words
in Frank, is an example of probable cause taking "into account the nature
of the search that is sought."
Terry represents the intersection of the line of cases creating excepticns to the warrant requirement and the Camara principle of adjusted
probable cause. Both Camaraand Terry are manifestations of the Warren
Court's rejection of the all-or-nothing conception of searches, i.e., an intrusion is either a search requiring traditional probable cause or a nothing
reauiring nothing, and their adherence to the all-or-nothing application
of the fourth amendment. The effort is always to accommodate the interest of the state in law enforcement, civil and criminal, and the interest
of the citizenry in being free of official interference.
39 See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), billed earlier as Camara's companion,
is not discussed here. It applied principles much like those in Camara
to the inspection of commercial facilities. From See onward a line of
cases developed regarding such inspections, but they are not strictly
relevant to this discussion. The rights of privacy involved in commercial
facilities are obviously not commensurate with those enjoyed in the
home. For an analysis of these cases see Sonnenreich and Pinco, The
Inspector Knocks: Administrative Inspection Warrants Under an Expanded Fourth Amendment, 24 Sw. L. J. 418 (1970).
40 Before we do, it will be helpful to look briefly at one other case decided
by the Camara Court. Although it does not deal with administrative
inspections, it is indicative of the Court's attitude toward governmental
intrusions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), overruled earlier
cases which had found some physical invasion of a "constitutionally protected area" necessary to constitute a search. In Katz, any situation in
which the defendant had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" was
sufficient to cloak him with the protection of the fourth amendment.
The effect was to divorce the amendment from its former dependence
on property rights and notions of trespass. The Constitution protects
people, not places. Further, there need not be a physical invasion at all.
Scientific devices which project the senses of agents into protected situations are perfectly capable of effecting a search. If electronic eavesdropping in places other than the home can be a search, it is difficult to
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visits to the home of each recipient of state aid to families
with dependent children (AFDC). Plaintiff, Barbara James, by
virtue of her son Maurice, had been receiving AFDC benefits
for 2 years prior to the dispute from which this case arose. At
the time her eligibility was first established, a caseworker visited
her home without objection.
On May 8, 1969, Mrs. James was notified that another visit
would be made on May 14. She telephoned the worker that
she would be willing to supply any information reasonable
and relevant to her continued receipt of assistance but that
any such meeting could not take place at her home. The
worker informed he.r that home visits were required by law
and refusal to allow the visit would mean termination of
assistance. Mrs. James was adamant.
The agency then notified plaintiff of its intent to discontinue assistance. Mrs. James requested and received a hearing
at which she had benefit of counsel. The review officer upheld
the decision to terminate. Plaintiff thereupon instituted a civil
rights suit under 42 U.S:C. § 1983 on behalf of herself, her son,
and all other persons similarly situated. She sought both
declaratory and injunctive relief.
4
Two opinions need to be considered: James v. Goldberg
(hereinafter James) in the district court, and Wyman v.
James4 2 (hereinafter Wyman) on appeal to the Supreme Court.

The James court found for the plaintiff. Their opinion was
a routine and very much to be expected application of Camara.
The court saw three issues, which for present purposes can be
condensed to two: (1) are warrantless home visits "unreasonable searches" so as to fall under the fourth amendment, and
(2) "assuming that [(1) is] answered in the affirmative, may
the State condition the initial and continuing receipt of AFDC
benefits upon a waiver of rights embodied in the fourth
43
amendment ?
For convenience, we can dispose of (2) first. It is taken
as settled law, for the moment at least, that the state cannot
require the waiver of a constitutional right as a condition to
imagine a situation in which the actual physical entry into a home would
not be so classified.
41 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 904 (1970).
42 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
4:303 F. Supp. 935, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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the receipt of any benefit - be it right or privilege. 4 Therefore, the answer to (1) will automatically decide (2). If warrantless home visits are unreasonable searches, then the receipt
of AFDC benefits cannot be conditioned upon waiver of the
rights violated. If they are not, then there is no constitutional
right to be waived.
The first issue may be further distilled. It has two elements which were not separated in the James opinion. First,
are home visits "searches," and second, if so, are such searches
when made without a warrant "unreasonable. ' '4 , These "subissues" offer the Court the opportunity to find for the defense
in either of two ways: (1) to find, as under Boyd, that the
fourth amendment does not apply at all to this type of intrusion, or (2) to apply only half of the amendment to home
visits, i.e., to find, as in Frank, that they are reasonable and
then not impose the warrant requirement.
As to the applicability of the fourth amendment, the state
argued that the home visit could not be called a "search." Its
purpose is to verify information as to eligibility and to assure
that all needed services are being provided, not to search for
evidence of crime or fraud. Besides, continued the argument,
there may have been fraud in the procurement of benefits
which could not otherwise be uncovered. The contradiction in
the last two statements was not lost on the court.
No thorough attempt is made to document this proposition, not for lack
of belief in its accuracy, but because it can have no real effect on the
central i-sue. Before it can come into play, there must be a determination that constitutional rights are involved. It is upon this determination
that the discussion is focused. For discussions of the unconstitutional
condition issue see French, Comments: Unconstitutional Conditions: An
Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234 (1961); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935); Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1439 (1968); O'Neill, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966).
45 Since the two "subissues" are not separately considered in the opinion,
efforts to choose judicial language sufficient to dispose cleanly of one
or the other are somewhat strained. Many defense arguments which the
court refers to in considering whether home visits are searches look very
much like those offered in Frank and Camara to support the reasonableness of an admitted search. Others deal more explicitly with the "searchness" of the intrusion. The combination of these two types of argument
under a single question may reflect trial tactics. After Camara it would
seem futile to argue, in the lower court at least, that an intrusion, though
covered by the fourth amendment, was reasonable without a warrant.
The more promising attack would be to attempt to qualitatively differentiate welfare home visits from administrative inspections and all other
intrusions heretofore labeled "search." For if the warrant requirement
is the inevitable concomitant of fourth amendment applicability, the
only way to avcid the former is to escape the latter. Whatever the reason
for unified treatment, there are present two distinct types of argument,
and they are treated separately in the text. It is felt thai what is lost
in precision is compensated for by increased convenience in comparison
to past cases.
44
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The Fourth Amendment . . . governs all intrusions by agents
of the public upon personal privacy and security. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, n.15
(1968). Any unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by plaintiff is a search. In view of the fact that
recent cases have expanded the scope of the Amendment so
as to eliminate the necessity for a finding of an actual physi-cal trespass upon a constitutionally protected area, Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50-53, 87 S.Ct. 1873, L.Ed. 2d 1040
(1967) and cases cited therein, defendant's restrictive argument
46
[that home visits are not searches] would appear frivolous.
Like most of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment was
not designed to be a shelter for criminals, but a basic protection for everyone..... "It is the individual's interest in
privacy which the Amendment protects, and that would not
officers."
appear to fluctuate with the 'intent' of the invading
T
Abel v. United States, [362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960)].4

Similar treatment was afforded arguments designed to
show that these visits, even without a warrant, were reasonable and therefore not condemned by the fourth amendment.
In addition to the "purpose" arguments given above, the
attorney general pointed to the procedural safeguards which
surrounded the search 4 and the public importance of home
visits for effective administration of the welfare laws. The
court was unimpressed.
"Except in certain carefully defined classes of cases (footwar-

note omitted), a search of a private dwelling without a
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Camara was cited for the proposition that the com-

munity interest in "inspection programs [is] not superior to
the important interests safeguarded by the fourth amendment's protection against official intrusion."

51

After discussing the question of unconstitutional conditions
the court turned more explicitly to the warrant requirement.
The public interest may demand creation of a general
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
46 303 F. Supp. 935, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

4 Id. at 941. The Court quoted passages from Little to the same effect.
IS 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). "[C]aseworkers are instructed not to
enter the home of an applicant for or recipient of benefits 'without permission by force, or under false pretenses, and not to make a search of
rd. at 940 (footnotes
the home by looking into closets and drawers."
omitted).
49 Id. at 940.
5,o
Id. at 942.
31 Id. at 941.
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only when it can be demonstrated "that there are available no
alternative means less subversive of constitutional right, narrowly drawn so as to correlate more closely with the purposes
contemplated by conferring the benefit." Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n of the County of Alameda [66 Cal. 2d 260, 425
P.2d 223 (1967)]. . . . This court cannot with deference to the

Fourth Amendment excuse the absence of a search warrant
without a showing by those who seek exemption from the

constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation
make that course imperative52

Several alternative means of obtaining the information
supposedly sought in home visits were listed, and if these
failed, a warrant based on a Camara-like standard of probable
cause was authorized.
Notice what the court is saying. As long as alternatives
are available, no visit can be made (a warrant should not
issue). Such a visit would be unreasonable because unnecessary.
Only when the alternatives have been exhausted is any intrusion justified. This puts the welfare agency to the test. If
the purpose is really to determine eligibility, then a home visit
will rarely be indispensable. If, on the other hand, the motive
is discovery of fraud, the agency will not be able to hide
behind an administrative warrant. The opinion noted that
since caseworkers are under a statutory duty to report suspected fraud, the latter element is not completely absent from
any home visit.
In all, James reached a result which, given Camara, was
entirely predictable. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.
But this was not the same Supreme Court which had heard
Camara. In 1967 Mr. Justice Clark retired and was replaced
by Mr. Justice Marshall, a man of more liberal leanings.
However, in 1969 Justice Fortas and Chief Justice Warren
retired, being replaced by Chief Justice Burger and, after
protracted wranglings, Justice Blackmun. The personality of
the Court had changed by the time the Wyman decision was
rendered.
The issues in Wyman are, of course, the same as in James.
Are home visits searches; if so, are they unreasonable; and, if
so, may AFDC benefits be terminated upon refusal to allow a
visit? James answered the first two in the affirmative and
the third in the negative. In alternative holdings, Wyman
answered both the first and second in the negative and therefore did not reach the third.
52 Id. at 943.
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The Wyman opinion begins with a strong statement of the
judicial tradition of jealous protection for fourth amendment
rights.5 3 We see again the Camara language that, except in
carefully defined classes of cases, any search without a warrant
or consent is unreasonable. Further, one's fourth amendment
rights do not depend upon suspicion of criminal behavior.
Up to this point, all is as it was in James. Indeed, these
propositions alone would have supported affirmance. But the
opinion goes on to say that the traditional protective attitude
is not a factor here "for the seemingly obvious and simple
reason" that no search as contemplated by the fourth amendment is involved.5 4 Lest the import of this holding slip past,
let it be repeated: A caseworker home visit - an "unauthorized physical penetration into" 55 the AFDC recipient's home
by an agent of the government - is not a search, and therefore not covered by the fourth amendment. After Camara
and Katz (see note 40 supra) it is surprising to learn that any
intrusion into personal privacy, let alone the privacy of the
home, is not a search. Perhaps the biggest surprise is that
what few reasons the Court gives in support of its conclusion
smack more of Boyd even than of Frank. For although a
Frank-type determination of the reasonableness of home visits
is later given, it is clearly an alternative ground of decision.
The primary holding centers, as in Boyd, on the criminal law
concept of searches. "It is . . . true that the caseworker's
posture is perhaps, in a sense, both rehabilitative and investigative. But this latter aspect, we think, is given too broad a
character and far more emphasis than it deserves if it is equated with a search in the traditional criminal law context."5 6
It is not difficult to quarrel with the Court's conception
of home visits. If caseworkers have a statutory duty to report
evidence of fraud in obtaining benefits, and state laws make
such fraud a crime, then a home visit is more than "perhaps,
in a sense" investigative. At the same time, it is easy to see
what the Court is driving at. There is a distinction, not in a
legal theory but in commo, sense, between a search or inspec53

Even making a sincere effort to ignore personal predilection, it must be

said that the Wyman opinion defies rational analysis. The best that can
be had is a presentation of the opinion as it appears, coupled with efforts
to assess the effect of each section.
54 This is the same "seemingly obvious and simple" argument that was
characterized as "frivolous" in James.
5 The quoted phrase is from James, and was there used to describe that
which is always a search.
.5 400 U.S. at 309, 317 (1971).
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tion of a house and the friendly visit of a concerned family
counselor. Based on this distinction, the fourth amendment
was held inapplicable to welfare visits. But the friendly visit
of a counselor is not what the Wyman facts portray. Constitutional rights come into play when the visit and the counseling
are unwanted. The picture then is conflict, not friendship.
Whatever the merit of the Court's reasoning, the fact remains that the coverage of the fourth amendment has been
limited. It applies only to intrusions which are searches. The
"searchness" of an intrusion depends upon the posture of the
intruder. If he is looking for statutory violations, civil or
criminal, his posture is investigative and he is conducting a
search. If, on the other hand, his sole, or even primary, objective is to counsel, his posture is rehabilitative and no search
is involved. The scale by which posture is measured is a search
in the traditional criminal law context. It will be recalled
that in Camara the purpose of the agent, for which posture
is surely just another word, was deemed irrelevant.
Almost as startling as the holding is the aplomb with
which it is given. The entire matter takes but a paragraph.
Not a single authority is cited. It rests solely on a policy
decision that the fourth amendment should not apply because
these visits are not really searches.
The Court touches two other factors in its primary holding
which are also used later to distinguish Camara and See.
These two cases, it is said, involved "true searches," presumably because of the investigative posture of the inspector.
Further, they arose out of criminal prosecutions for refusal
to permit inspections. Mrs. James faced no such threat. When
she denied permission to visit, there was no entry of her home
and therefore no search. The sole consequence was termination of AFDC benefits. If Mrs. James were being prosecuted
criminally for her action, these cases "would have conceivable
pertinency."
To be frank, the logic and relevance of this argument
escapes the author. Once Camara has been distinguished on
the basis of posture, of what moment are the other facts given?
Just as in Wyman, when permission to inspect was denied in
Camara, no inspection was made. The only concrete difference
is the penalty attached. If the Court is saying that an intrusion is a search because of the consequences of refusing to
allow it, they are announcing a novel doctrine indeed. Even
assuming that they are, the relative gravity of the loss of
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one's sole source of income as compared to a municipal fine
would not seem to support such a doctrine in this case. What
they are probably saying is that although home visits are not
searches and do not violate fourth amendment rights, refusal
to allow a visit cannot be made a crime. If no constitutional
rights are involved, why not? There is no satisfactory answer.
The criminal penalty/loss of benefits distinction is a convenient way of distinguishing past cases and at the same time
giving an idea of the limits of the "true search" doctrine. The
presence of these limits betrays a lack of confidence in the
flat assertion that the fourth amendment is not a part of the
conflict between the individual dual and the state in welfare
home visits.
The most obvious manifestation of insecurity about the
primary holding is the fact that the Court went on to supply
an independently sufficient alternative ground of decision. It
begins with the equivocal statement that even if it is assumed
"that a caseworker's home visit . .. somehow . . .and despite
its interview nature, does possess some of the characteristics
of a search in the traditional sense, we nevertheless conclude
that the visit does not fall within the fourth amendment's
proscription. This is because it does not descend to the level
of unreasonableness.1'5 7 Then follows a list of some eleven
factors which demonstrate the not unreasonable nature of
home visits. Suffice it to say that the list contains all of the
justifications offered in Frank and Camara - public need, procedural safeguards, not for the purpose of uncovering evidence
of crime, inappropriateness of the warrant procedure - plus
a few more unique to the welfare context - need to protect
the child, need to assure proper use of tax funds, must visit
to properly counsel, etc. The sum of these factors is reasonableness in the mathematics of the Court, and therefore no
warrant is -required. Since the assumed search is not unreasonable, no constitutional rights are put on the block as a
condition to receipt of benefits, and so AFDC benefits can be
terminated if permission to visit is refused. The midnight
raid type of welfare operation is specifically exempted, that
being "another question for another day."
Rather than quibble with the truth of the "reasonableness
factors," the more enlightening effort is to assess what the
Court has done by considering them at all, regardless of their
57 Id.

at 318.
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merit. Similar arguments in Camara were attended by little
success. The question was not whether an intrusion could be
made, but whether it could be made without a warrant. These
reasonableness arguments speak only to what the question
was not, i.e., because of these factors a home visit is reasonable in general, but nothing is known about its reasonableness
in particular. By allowing satisfaction of the first half of the
fourth amendment to suffice for the whole, the Court returned
to the Frank position on a more narrow plane. Not administrative searches, but only welfare home visits are excepted from
the warrant requirement.
Although this second holding is given in the alternative,
it is certainly sufficient on its own to dictate the Wyman
result.58 For which proposition does Wyman stand? Are caseworker visits not searches, or are they reasonable searches?
The former is clearly the primary holding, but it is inconceivable, especially in view of the distinction made between
criminal penalties and loss of AFDC benefits, that home visits
can never involve fourth amendment rights. Perhaps future
cases will determine which of the Wyman arguments is the
"true" view of home visits. From the standpoint of the welfare recipient, the legal theory upon which their benefits are
terminated is of little importance.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Two constructs of the fourth amendment can be assembled
from the cases examined. Although we have seen more than
two distinct results, each falls under one of two conceptions
of the amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure. The dividing line is the view taken of the warrant requirement. For convenience, the reference will be to
the Camara and Wyman views.
In Camara, the fourth amendment appears as one of the
major tenets of the individuals relationship with the state.
As was said in Little, the amendment is not a limit imposed
on some preexisting power of the state to intrude, but rather
an expression of the right, inherent in the people, to be absolutely free from governmental intrusion. A necessary exception to this right is made in the warrant procedure. This is
,s Support for the independency of the alternative holding is found in the
vote of Justice White. He concurred in the decision and with the opinion
excluding that portion which contained the primary holding. This is a
curious vote for the author of the Camara opinion when it is remembered
what the question there was not.
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a grant of power to intrude pursuant to an established procedure, and, therefore, any intrusion not so made is ultra
vires the government. It is absolutely powerless to act outside
Such an interpretation transcends
the warrant procedure.-_
any consideration of purpose, nature, extent, etc. The fourth
amendment embodies a personal right which inheres in every
individual and governs all of his contacts with the state. If
the state has a reasonable need to intrude, then it is provided
for in the warrant exception.
The Wyman conception of fourth amendment rights is
more difficult to assess. All the traditional statements of
reverence are intoned like a liturgy at the first of the opinion,
yet the result is to the contrary no matter which holding is
chosen. The fundamental difference in the Camara and
Wyman views is that the latter does not regard the warrant
procedure as a grant of the only permissible power to intrude.
In the primary holding, the warrant requirement is not a
factor at all in certain types of intrusions. The boundary of
coverage is for the moment unimportant. What is important
is that a boundary can be drawn. The alternative holding sees
the warrant requirement as a fungible means of control on
government power, which may, in appropriate cases, be replaced by an advance judicial determination of reasonableness
The Court is free to decide which intrusions are subject to
which control. Again, although the two holdings take different routes to the same result, both reject the grant of
power view of the warrant requirement.
It should be emphasized that these constructs are merely
judicial attitudes toward the fourth amendment. They are not
laws between which a judge must choose and then be bound.
Rather, they are descriptions of what a judge with a given
attitude feels himself free to consider in reaching a decision.
The question becomes which attitude is it more desirable that
a majority of the Court adopt.
The Camara construct is more restrictive, and more protective of personal freedom. In any given case, the rule would
be that all intrusions are searches, and all searches outside
the warrant procedure are unreasonable." It is still possible
that some opposing interest could overbalance fourth amend.,The established exceptions to the warrant requirement are once again
an obstacle. All that can be said is that they must be considered a part
of the warrant procedure. Any reference to that procedure is intended
to countenance the exceptions.
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ment rights, but such an interest would have to be absolutely
vital to the performance of an indispensable state function.
On the other hand, a judge with the Wyman attitude feels
free to consider the quality of the intrusion to determine
whether it is a search or, alternatively, whether it is a reasonable search.
The effect that this difference in approach can have is
tremendous. When a judge considers the quality of an intrusion, his decision is bound to be colored by personal preconceptions about the situation in which it occurred. Evidence
of such preconceptions at work in Wyman is not difficult to
find. In the list of factors given to show the reasonableness
of home visits, the Court draws an analogy between the welfare program and the charity of a private philanthropist. The
public should have the same right as a private benefactor to
see how charitable funds are put to work. Recent literature
has thoroughly discredited the charity notion of welfare. 60
Social conditions operating in American society tend to relegate whole classes of citizens to a status of dependency. Those
who benefit from these same social forces should compensate
those oppressed. No loss of constitutional dignity is involved
it is a purely economic matter.
This is not meant to be a debate on the subject of welfare. Many may accept Justice Blackmun's view. But this is
an example of the kind of consideration that inevitably creeps
in when the Wyman conception of the fourth amendment is
applied to a set of facts. An even more glaring example appears in one of the Court's footnotes." The Court says that
its examination of Mrs. James welfare file discloses that hers
is a "sad and unhappy" picture. She has never really satisfied the eligibility requirements; has been uncooperative; has
a bad attitude; has made repeated demands; and has occasionally been belligerent. The note broadly implies that she beats
her son. All this may be true. But should this report card
information affect the constitutional rights of not only Mrs.
James, but all other welfare recipients? Suppose, for instance,
that the situation were reversed so that the caseworker and
not the recipient was of questionable character. After Wyman,
the receipient has no protection against abuse of welfare agency
power so long as that power is exercised through home visits.
60 E.g., Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
61 400 U.S. 309, 322 n. 9 (1971).
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In many areas of the law, maximum judicial flexibility to
consider various kinds of information is essential if legal
norms are to continue to reflect changing social needs and
goals. However, when fundamental rights are involved, especially when those rights are a primary source of individual
protection from governmental encroachment on personality and
dignity, flexibility may be a risk not worth taking. Prior to
Wyman, the fourth amendment had offered blanket protection. Even if the contraction of protection in Wyman is not
personally objectionable, the potential for future contraction
must be frightening when considerations like those given above
can have a significant effect on decisions rendered under the
6 2
Wyman attitude.

III. THE COURT
The furor over the Nixon "strict constructionist" appointments and the widespread curiosity about what their effect
will be make a prediction of future Court performance irresistible. We move now into the realm of conjecture and generalization. No specific prediction can be made even in fourth
amendment cases. All that can be gauged is the Court's
apparent frame of mind.
Wyman indicates that individual rights will not carry the
same weight as they did before the recent personnel changes.
This is not an hysterical prediction of the total withdrawal
of constitutional protections. It is only to say that at the
margin, at the very limits of constitutional theory, the possibility that individual liberty may be infringed will not prove
the decisive factor. If, for instance, a case involved a conflict
between an important state interest and some constitutionally
protected individual liberty, and that liberty was only slightly
or even speculatively impinged, the Court would be less likely
than in the past to attach an almost absolute value to the
liberty at the expense of the state interest. Obviously, no court
would allow a crucial state interest to be totally frustrated.
But this new approach would be more reluctant to consign
the state to an alternative means of vindicating its interest
which was considerably more burdensome.
All this is very general, perhaps a more concrete example
of the same general frame of mind may serve to better illustrate this feeling about the Court. Lawyers sometimes argue
62

The "red scare" of the fifties comes to mind.
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in terms of a "parade of horrors" which will result from a
decision unfavorable to their client. Imagine, if you will, such
arguments as they might be made by each attorney in Wyman.
Counsel for Mrs. James would point to the destructive effects
on welfare recipients nationwide of a decision not affording
full fourth amendment protection. Second class citizenship in
the eyes of the law would, when combined with the handicap
of economic deprivation, strip those on welfare of the last
traces of human dignity. One who must open his door to the
prying eyes of the government in order to retain his only
source of funds can make little claim to the primacy implicit
in the notion that a man's home is his castle. If the cost of
maintaining constitutional dignity is economic death, then the
lofty promise of America is but a mocking rumble in the
empty stomachs of her less fortunate citizens. A man of even
moderate means can protect himself with wealth and community standing. A poor man has only the Constitution. If
the courts fail to make that shield adequate, then physical violence is his only available alternative.
Further, the power to use necessarily carries with it the
power to abuse. Welfare recipients would be without protection against agency visiting practices in the future which are
clearly unreasonable no matter how the Court classifies home
visits in general. To allow such a power without providing
an advance restraint is to invite its misuse, whether through
misanthropy or negligence.
On the other side, counsel for the agency would cite the
almost unlimited potential for welfare fraud. The unscrupulous recipient could milk the government of thousands of dollars by fabricating eligibility statistics. Children can be passed
from mother to mother, raising the entitlement of all and yet
receiving the alloted benefit from none. Separations which
never actually occurred will be used to qualify the wife for
benefits while her husband is earning a full salary or regularly
declining employment for the more luxurious "welfare cadillac" life. The hard earned dollars of the industrious American taxpayer will go down 1he drain of sloth and deceit.
Further, a major goal of the welfare program is to provide
counseling and guidance to the end that families now in
poverty will be able to better themselves and move off the
welfare roles. Home visits are essential to the attainment of
this goal. Those who resist efforts to provide the needed services demonstrate that their only real interest is continued re-
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ceipt of funds without effort on their part. It is totally unfair
to allow some members of society to demand tax money as
of right and all the while thumb their collective noses at the
benevolent government agents who seek only to assist them.
These rather lengthy parades will strike different readers
in different ways. Both have merit, and the interests contained
in each deserve protection. Almost undoubtedly, they would
be protected to some extent by either the Burger ox the Warren Court. But the difference in terms of the frame of mind
lies in which parade would most horrify which Court. It is
the author's opinion that the possibility of widespread and defiant welfare fraud would be more offensive to the sensibilities
of the Burger Court, while the human consequences of coerced
home visits would have been more obnoxious to the Warren
Court.
The old adage that hard cases make bad law has special
relevance here. There is no solution to the Wyman case which
would make "good law." The choice must be which solution,
according to a particular value structure, would make better
law, i.e., prevent the less desirable parade of horrors. Perfect
accommodation of diverse interests is always impossible. The
question in any hard case is the direction in which it is preferable to err. The Warren Court apparently felt that it was
better, if err they must, to be overprotective of individual
liberty at the risk of slighting governmental interests. If
Wyman is a valid indication, the Burger Court is more willing
to take the risk of infringing upon personal rights in order to
guard against shortchanging the government. A judgment as
to the merit of these two positions devolves to the personal
question of whether the individual or the state can better
afford to be slighted.
IV.

AFTERWARD

It seems fitting to close with a piece of judicial language
which expresses the author's opinion, and most likely that of
the Warren Court, as to the attitude most appropriate for the
consideration of cases involving fundamental human liberties.
The words are taken from a section of Boyd in which the
Court was discussing the fact that the type of search in question was at the very limit of fourth amendment protection.
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of pro-
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cedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule
that constitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed. A close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads
to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more
in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against
63
any stealthy encroachments thereon.
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